Recent scientific controversy over the accuracy of population attributable fraction (PAF) estimates for obesity as a cause of mortality has made the concept of PAF visible in both scientific and popular news. The PAF is widely thought to provide information about causation, or attribution, of disease and also to provide information on the consequences of interventions to eliminate the exposure of interest. I discuss the methodological and conceptual limitations of the PAF in providing these two kinds of information. Because of these limitations, the PAF does not provide scientists or policy makers with an accurate answer to the question, How much of the disease burden could be eliminated if the exposure was eliminated from the population? Further, these limitations cannot be overcome merely by better statistical modeling; they must be addressed through more rigorous discussion of specific interventions and the causal consequences of such interventions.
Introduction
Recent scientific controversy over the accuracy of population attributable fraction (PAF) estimates to describe the percentage of total mortality due to obesity has made the concept of PAF visible in both scientific and popular news. There has not been much discussion over the more fundamental question of what the benefits are of such PAF estimates. Given the many scientific resources that have been directed at the topic of PAF estimation for obesity in the United States, and the publication of findings in some of the country's top medical and scientific journals, [1] [2] [3] [4] this question is worth asking. In this essay, I discuss limitations to several common assumptions about the PAF, and I offer an answer to the question, when is a PAF estimate meaningful?
The PAF is widely regarded as an estimate of the proportion of disease burden (or the number of cases) causally explained by, or attributable to, the risk factor(s) being considered. Correspondingly, it is also regarded as a quantity that has practical public health relevance: it can help us think about the consequences of strategies to eliminate exposure(s), and it can also help to prioritize public health problems. The PAF is most often defined as the proportion of disease incidence, or of disease risk, that would be eliminated from the population if exposure to the risk factor was eliminated. I first discuss problems with the PAF when it comes to 'explaining' or attributing causality of disease in the population, and I then discuss the issue of informing scientists and policy makers about the consequences of preventive interventions.
Limitations of PAF when considering disease causality in populations
As the PAF estimate centers on the issue of determining the proportion or number of cases that are attributable to the exposure of interest, a common inference is that the remaining proportion (or number) of cases are not causally related to the exposure. If, for instance, scientists estimate that the PAF for obesity as a cause of a certain disease outcome is 20%, a common assumption would be that 80% of the cases of this outcome are not causally related to obesity.
The logic that leads to this simple causal partitioning at the population level is flawed for several reasons. Almost two decades ago, Greenland and Robins 5 discussed a large flaw in this reasoning, in the distinction that they noted between 'excess' and 'etiologic' cases. They provided a thorough discussion of why the PAF usually greatly underestimates the proportion of disease burden that is actually related etiologically to the exposure. According to the authors, because of its arithmetic construction, the attributable fraction counts as 'attributable' only those cases that are 'excess'Fthat is, only those that would not have occurred by a specific time had exposure not occurred. The potentially large number of cases in which exposure plays an etiologic role (hence the name 'etiologic cases'), although not necessarily the causally 'attributable' role of pushing a person from the non-diseased into the diseased group by a specified point in time, is not included in the attributable fraction. Greenland and Robins thoroughly discussed the difference between etiologic and excess cases, and they showed why the attributable fraction would usually greatly underestimate the proportion of disease burden that is truly related etiologically to the exposure. From the standpoint of understanding the complexity of causal mechanisms, this is a severe limitation of the attributable fraction.
There are other reasons to mistrust the assumption that the PAF provides useful information about partitioning or attributing the causes of disease in the population. The model of sufficient component causes, which underlies much epidemiologic thinking about causality, dictates that a given case of disease could theoretically have been averted over a considered time period if any one of a sufficient set of causes was averted. For this reason, the PAFs for different exposures considered one at a time will usually sum up to far greater than 100% (or, equivalently, to far greater than the total number of cases) for a given outcome. Mokdad et al., 2 in the paper that ignited much of the continuing controversy over the obesity-mortality relation, estimated the PAFs for a variety of exposures in terms of their contribution to mortality. Out of 2.4 million deaths that occurred in the United States in 2000, they estimated that 435 000 were attributable to tobacco, 365 000 were attributable to poor diet and physical inactivity/obesity, 85 000 were attributable to alcohol, 75 000 were attributable to microbial agents, and so forth. If these authors had continued to examine risk factors for mortality, they would have ended up with well over 2.4 million deaths. In the single-factor-at-a-time PAF analytic method employed by Mokdad et al., one can see that a death attributable to exposure X (say, obesity) might also be attributable to exposure Y (say, alcohol). Clearly, the designation of an outcome as attributable to exposure X (rather than Y) may be at least somewhat arbitrary. In addition to appreciating the arbitrary nature of causal or explanatory attribution inherent in estimating a PAF one exposure at a time, we should also recognize that a high PAF is not necessarily indicative of a better scientific understanding of the cause(s) of disease in the population than a low PAF. Quite simply, the definition of exposure matters a great deal. As Wacholder et al. 6 have demonstrated, the PAF will always increase with a broader definition of exposure, provided that the persons newly included under the broader definition have a relative risk for disease greater than 1.0 when compared with the remaining unexposed. There would seem to be no meaningful biological sense in which scientists could say that a higher proportion of disease cases are now causally explained simply because the definition of exposure has been broadened (that is, the threshold separating exposed and unexposed has been changed). What can be clearly said is that the definition of exposure is more sensitiveFthat is, a higher proportion of people who will develop disease will now 'test positive' in the sense of being classified as exposed, and that if this more broadly defined exposure was now to be eliminated from the population, a higher proportion of disease risk would be eliminated. Baron 7 notes the algebraic similarity between the formula for the PAF, (P(D)ÀP(D|Ē))/P(D), where P(D) is the (unconditional) probability of disease over a specified time period, and P(D|Ē) is the probability of disease over the same time period conditional on nonexposed status, and the formula for the predictive sensitivity of a risk factor, defined as the probability of being exposed, given that the disease will develop over the considered time period. The formula for sensitivity can be arithmetically expressed as
. 7 The PAF has often been misinterpreted as this latter quantity, the sensitivity of exposure, or in other words, as the proportion of disease cases that have the risk factor(s) of interest. For example, summary attributable fractions for breast cancer in the realm of 25% have frequently been misinterpreted as meaning that only 25% of women who get breast cancer have any known risk factors, and thus 75% of all breast cancer cases have no known risk factors. The reality is just the oppositeFnearly all women (in the United States) are exposed to at least one major risk factor for the disease, at least according to conventional epidemiologic definitions of these risk factors. 8 The main point is that the PAF is not the same as the proportion of cases with the risk factor of interest; indeed, the two quantities can be very different. Just as in traditional methodologies for disease screening, improvements in the sensitivity of a given tool come at the expense of specificity. (The predictive specificity of a risk factor is defined as the proportion of the persons remaining healthy over the time period who are labeled unexposed.) A broader definition of exposure means that a higher proportion of eventually diseased people will fall under the exposed label (thus enabling one to estimate a higher PAF), but that a lower proportion of destined-to-remain healthy people will wind up in the unexposed category. Because specificity (rather than sensitivity) is the primary determinant of the positive predictive value of a risk factor, an increase in predictive sensitivity of a given definition of exposure is accompanied by a decrease in the positive predictive value of exposure. This positive predictive value can be written as P(D|E), which is exactly equivalent to the absolute risk of disease, given a particular exposure. Put more succinctly, as a definition of exposure is made more sensitive, the PAF will increase, but the absolute risk of disease associated with the broader definition of exposure (its positive predictive value) will decline.
Although the PAF is often described as the quantity of disease 'explainable by' or 'due to' exposure, the description runs counter to what most epidemiologists and medical scientists mean today when they talk about 'understanding' or 'explaining' disease occurrence. How do epidemiologists judge whether an acceptably high proportion of disease risk is already 'explainable' (and thus no further etiologic
The other causality question BJ Levine research is needed) or whether more research is indeed needed? Although explicit answers to such a foundational question are rarely offered, it is implicit in much current epidemiologic writing that it is high positive predictive value (that is, high absolute risk of disease given a particular exposure) rather than high predictive sensitivity (that is, high proportion of destined-to-be-diseased persons labeled as 'exposed') that is the underlying goal of the ever-continuing search for 'causes.' Our science is continually moving in the direction of trying to better predict the futures of individual persons in terms of diseaseFwitness the rise of genetic epidemiologyFrather than in the direction of examining strategies for reducing mass exposures related, often through quite modest relative risks, to disease, exposures that may nonetheless be associated with high PAFs.
In sum, the PAF cannot be used to delineate what proportion of disease or mortality is causally related to a given factor. We would be wise to listen to Kempthorne, who, in a classic Biometrics paper, 9 presented strong arguments against any attempt to quantitatively partition causality when multiple factors or forces together determine the outcome. He argued that the results of such attempts are meaningless from the standpoint of understanding causal processes as well as from the standpoint of considering realistic effects of intervention. It is to this topic, consideration of the effects of intervention, that I now turn.
Limitations of PAF with respect to interventions to prevent disease
A PAF estimate provides an answer to a very specific and precise question: what proportion of disease risk in the population could be eliminated if the absolute risk in the exposed was to suddenly, and sustainably, go to the level of absolute risk in the unexposed, while nothing else, including absolute risk in the unexposed, was to change? One immediately helpful consequence of this precise phrasing is that it is readily seen that modifiability (or elimination) of the exposure itself is not the key criterion; the key is elimination of the (excess) risk associated with the exposure. The key limitation of the question we have articulated is its incompleteness. Scientists cannot estimate the (causal) effects of eliminating an exposure from the population until they specify the intervention to be used in the elimination.
There has been much discussion and debate about the actual magnitude of the US deaths that in a single year are attributable to obesity. In contrast, there has been no published discussion of whether the primary public health concern underlying the debate is a valid one. There is no scientific or social consensus that the distribution of exposure to obesity is modifiable in any meaningful way, that is, that something can ethically and effectively be done to greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the prevalence of obesity in the US population. Simply reasoning that the distribution of body mass was once different than it is today, and thus is 'modifiable,' is overly simple reasoning. Consider that the proportions of persons working in subsistence agriculture, or unexposed to air conditioning, were once much higher in the United States than they are today; surely we would not think it ethical to engineer a return to such high 'exposures. ' Even if there were a scientific consensus that the prevalence of obesity could be greatly reduced in the United States, different interventions to achieve this reduction would have different effects on the burden of mortality. As Hernan 10 points out, the notion of 'causal effect' is not well defined unless one can specify an intervention, even a hypothetical one, to eliminate the cause. He notes that the value of the counterfactual outcome (which in the obesitymortality PAF situation is the lower number of total deaths that would be observed if the prevalence of obesity was zero) depends entirely on the specific intervention used to manipulate the exposure. A strategy to eliminate (or greatly reduce the prevalence of) obesity in the United States that relied on, say, successful persuasion of the overweight and obese members of the population to adopt healthy eating and activity patterns that enabled them to shed pounds slowly, safely and sustainably would have very different consequences for public health and mortality than a strategy that relied on the widespread use of gene therapy or liposuction, or coercion by employers, teachers and others in authority to increase the expenditure of calories at work and at school. Further, all of these planned interventions would obviously have different consequences than a catastrophic event for which the indirect and long-term result was a great reduction in the prevalence of obesity. Which of these hypothetical interventions has its causal effect captured in the obesity-mortality PAF estimate? It is a great irony that, in all the discussions about attributable fraction, the 'causality' question that has received the most attention is whether there is truly a causal relationship between exposure and outcome. See, for instance, the discussion about attributable fraction in the Encyclopedia of Biostatistics, 11 where the three conditions that must be met for the attributable fraction to be interpreted as the proportion of disease risk that is eliminable are the following: (1) the estimation of the attributable fraction is unbiased; (2) the exposure is causal rather than merely associated with disease; and (3) elimination of the risk factor has no effect on the distribution of other risk factors. If one cannot assume a causal relationship between exposure and disease, calculation of the attributable fraction will indeed have no clear value, as the above criteria assert. Yet it is also true that there is an equally important question of causality that needs to be addressed if the attributable fraction is to have any real meaning: what intervention is available to cause the assumed reduction in disease risk? This question has received scant, if indeed any, attention in the literature on attributable fraction. Yet we have data available in many topic areas for which an attributable fraction is estimated to at least begin to address this question.
Hernan 10 asks, 'What is the point of estimating a causal effect that is not well defined?' Scientists must ask the same question with respect to estimating PAF for the obesitymortality association. There has been no discussion accompanying the estimates of what type of theoretical intervention, if any, corresponds to the estimated achievable reduction in mortality burden. The usual statement, whether explicit or implied, is that the estimated achievable reduction in mortality (whether it is closer to 100 000 or 400 000 deaths does not matter) pertains to an imagined situation where a hypothetical and unspecified intervention causes the mortality risk in the obese to instantaneously become that of the non-obese, whereas no other risk factors for mortality change. Another statement sometimes offered is that the estimated reduction in mortality pertains to the hypothetical situation in which the obese people had never become obese in the first place and had always been like the non-obese. Neither of these answers are helpful to scientists, who learn nothing about causal mechanisms relating obesity to mortality in the population. Nor are they helpful to public health policy makers, who learn nothing about the public health consequences of specific, realistic interventions to reduce the prevalence of obesity or even just its harmful effects. Finally, many assume that the PAF can be used, at the least, to rank order exposures in terms of their negative consequences for public health. For instance, if the PAF estimate for obesity (considering total mortality as the outcome) is higher than that for smoking (considering the same outcome), an intuitive conclusion is that obesity is the more burdensome exposure and should receive more attention from public health professionals. This interpretation is overly simplistic. Issues of available interventions, the risks and benefits of such interventions and the relationship of the exposure to other exposures in the population (that is, is it feasible to even hypothesize about changing the exposure while holding all other risk factors 'equal?') must be rigorously addressed before one can assume that an exposure with a higher PAF is more important for policy makers to consider than another exposure.
Conclusion
The PAF is a measure usually interpreted in two related ways: as an estimate of the proportion of disease burden in the population that is causally attributable to the exposure, and as an estimate of the reduction in disease burden that would be achieved by eliminating the exposure. I have argued in this paper that the PAF does not provide useful scientific information about disease causality, or attribution. Nor does it provide, in itself, information useful to policy makers, who must consider the real risks and benefits of different public health interventions, because no intervention is specified in any PAF estimate.
Too often, a simple PAF calculation is performed, an estimate is derived and a percentage or absolute number takes on a life of its own, as it has in breast cancer and now obesity. In reality, the percentage or absolute number may mean relatively little. At the least, it may not mean what most people assume it does. The PAF, by itself, has a very limited hypothetical meaning: if the disease risk of the exposure was to instantaneously become that of the unexposed, the estimated proportion of the disease burden would be eliminated. It is unclear, therefore, that any PAF estimate for the obesity-mortality association, no matter how carefully the relative risks and prevalence of exposure are chosen, no matter how painstakingly the estimators have considered confounding and effect modification, can be said to be a realistic estimate of the consequences of a specific intervention to eliminate obesity or to remove its health consequences.
This paper is not, in the end, an argument for never computing a PAF. Rather, it is an argument for more clarity, justification and complex thinking when using PAFs to say something about causal apportioning or explaining of disease, or to hypothesize about the consequences of preventive intervention to greatly reduce the prevalence of exposure. A PAF is but a very tentative beginning of the discussion of the public health consequences of intervening to reduce the prevalence of a particular exposure; it has, all too often, been taken as the end of the discussion, at least by epidemiologists.
